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THE DUTY PROBLEM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 
The undertaking to restate the rules and principles developed by the 
English and American courts finds'in the field of torts a most hopeless 
task. A loose classification permits an infinite variety of types of con- 
duct to be classed as torts. The rules, for most part, which govern these 
cases are still liquid. Only the types of conduct which are also designated 
crimes can be said to be subject to crystallized rules of tort law. Even 
here the definiteness and certainty ordinarily assumed are illusory. If 
this bulk of law has not yet been crystallized by the judicial process. 
in what manner can legal scholars speed up the process? And what 
is more, where are the stabilizing factors to be found? 
The Nature of Law 
In order to control the conduct of our neighbors and ourselves 
much machinery is employed. Judges, policemen, legislatures, teachers, 
practitioners, principles, rules, formulas, doctrines, standards-a multi- 
tude of devices too numerous to catalog. At this whole complex of 
government we throw the term "law," and immediately difficulties are 
encountered. To this term is given a host of meanings.' It cannot be 
said that any of them are correct or incorrect. It is merely a matter of 
language. "Law" is most frequently defined as "rules recognized and 
acted on in courts of justice,"2 "a rule of civil conduct,"3 "command of 
the sovereign,"4 "the sum of rules of justice administered in a state,"5 
"body of rules which the courts . . . apply in deciding cases."6 Dean 
Pound says, "there are three elements that make up the whole of what 
we call law"; (1) legal precepts, (2) traditional ideas and technique of 
interpreting, developing and applying legal precepts, and (3) philosoph- 
ical, political and ethical ideas as to the end of law.7 Dean Wigmore 
says: "Law is the quality of being uniform and regular in a series of 
1See Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 
643: "Most of the discussion as to the nature of law which has been the staple 
of Anglo-American writing on jurisprudence has suffered from an initial false 
assumption that 'law' is a single conception; that the one short word has one 
simple analytically ascertainable meaning. As one reads the voluminous literature 
upon this subject he soon feels that the disputants are speaking of different things, 
although calling them by one name." 
2 SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1916) ? 5. 
81 BL. COMM. *44. 
AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (Student's ed. 1875) 11, 16. 5 
POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (1896) 17, 18. 
GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 110, see generally 
c. IV. 7 Pound, op. cit. supra note 1, at 645. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 17:06:57 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE DUTY PROBLEM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 1015 
events. . . . Jural law is a rule expressing the relations of human con- 
duct conceived as subject to realization by state force."8 
In all of these concepts the power to control conduct through pass- 
ing judgment is identified with the instrumentalities through which the 
power itself is employed. Law is identified with the machinery of law. 
This is a common conception of law. To a large part of our population 
the policeman is "the law." And this is no stranger than the more pop- 
ular belief that "the law" consists of statutes and constitutions, nor is it 
any less accurate than that more sophisticated notion of the legal scholar 
that "the law" is to be found in the decisions of courts and in the rules, 
principles and standards which courts announce and employ. Each in- 
dividual objectifies law with the devices with which he most frequently 
comes into contact. But all of these are merely the wiring and fixtures 
with which we equip our legal habitat. A decision of a case is no more 
law than the light from last night's lamp is electricity. We make use of 
decisions, statutes and constitutions for the purpose of developing and 
controlling the capacity to pass desirable judgments and employ these 
and scores of other devices in order to make judgments effectual. But 
that is their limit; they stop short of any power within themselves. By 
suggesting that law has been confused with the machinery through which 
it operates, I do not mean to minimize the importance of the machinery. 
My emphasis is that it is machinery. The gas engine and multiplication 
table are devices without price. There can be no power without ma- 
chinery; there can be no law without judges and courts and rules. But 
machinery without power is impotent. Hence "law" as here conceived 
is the power of passing judgment-the power of passing judgment 
through formal political agencies for securing social control.9 
This distinction may be nothing more than a change of emphasis, 
2 WIGMORE, SELECT CASES OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1912) App. A, ? 2. 9 In attempting to articulate the judicial process in negligence cases there is 
no place to start save with a postulate as to the nature of law. No extended 
development of such a postulate is possible here. On the other hand it is essential 
that its outline be indicated. None of the concepts of law with which he has 
become acquainted permit the emphasis which the writer feels should be given to 
the administration of law. The power to pass judgment as the basis of social 
control is thus offered as a starting point from which it is possible to account 
for the behaviour of judges as part of a law administration system. This is not 
as extravagant a theory as the concept of "power" would indicate. What is power? 
We might as well ask what is force. What is spirit? What is electricity? What 
is life? Perhaps the answer for one would be the answer to all. Probably all 
science gets back to the same starting point here. And whether the inquiry is 
futile or not is beside the point. The important hing is not what power is, but 
how it can be utilized. Whatever assumptions we make, however high-sounding 
the names we give them, the upshot is this: "Here is something we use. How 
can we do so to the best advantage?" But this does not mean that it is not of 
the utmost importance to identify this power. It is. Hence, instead of starting 
with some such postulate as a rule or aggregate of rules, the writer starts with 
the power which operates through rules. This power he calls "law." 
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but it seems to be one worth making. It implies in the beginning that 
law is indefinable and ungraspable. Politically its source may be sover- 
eignty; religiously it may be God. These are nothing more than figures 
of speech by which to adjust the horizons of thought in those directions. 
But in so far as the sources of law are apparent, they are found in the 
judgments of the individuals who are entrusted with the power to pass 
those judgments. And this would, in turn, imply that any science of law 
is, at bottom, the science of the administration of law. Once this point 
has been reached, the major problems of such a science stand out boldly. 
They are: (1) a language technic, and (2) a judging technic. To these 
may be added, of necessity, (3) a statistical technic.10 
A Language Technic 
The struggle which men are making to rise above the word level 
seems to have no end. "The power of words is the most conservative 
force in our lives" say Ogden and Richards.1l Only now, if at all, is 
there any indication that the bonds of "holy words" are weakening. 
Word ritual under one guise or another has always been one of the 
primary methods of law administration, and the development of the uses 
made of words is one of the most puzzling of studies. We can scarcely 
realize the part which sacred words, taboo words, magic words, continue 
to play in our law. While historically these were among the first uses 
of language, nevertheless words of modern mintage frequently quickly 
develop these characteristics.12 No sooner had the written word become 
10 No business can be operated successfully without its accounting department. 
Yet here is the largest business in America with no means at hand for seeing it- 
self in operation. Little wonder it functions so poorly. Nothing speaks so highly 
foi the soundness of our society as this ability to survive without knowing how 
or what society's chief protective organism is doing. How can courts modify 
their practices or legislatures make changes without the knowledge of results 
achieved from day to day by the machinery in operation? When no one knows, 
one person's guess is as good as another's. Guesses must give way here to facts. 
Something can be gained from borrowing the statistical methods of the other 
social sciences, but the job will probably require the development of a technic 
suited to the particular difficulties of law administration. The various crime sur- 
veys of the past few years look in this direction. And it is of more than passing 
significance that the foundations are beginning to see the opportunities which 
are open at this point. Of necessity there will be many trials and errors before 
a pattern is developed which will lay open the results our legal machinery is 
producing, but that the pattern must be developed is too obvious for debate. 
1 OGDEN & RICHARDS, MEANING OF MEANING (1925) 25. 2 The term "duty" for instance is a relatively new term. Is it merely a sym- 
bol, or has it some "inherent" meaning which makes it sacred? Clearly as em- 
ployed in legal science it is a symbol, such as "right," "immunity" and others like 
them designed to reduce to a single word a network of ideas. Yet I have heard 
intelligent lawyers talk most earnestly of "duty" as the most sacred word in the 
language save "God," and develop an extravaganza as to how those other sacred 
words "mother" and "country" are themselves dependent upon "duty." Doubtless 
every such term as "right," "contract," "liberty," "property," "constitution," and 
numerous others, gathers the same sort of emotive qualities. What can legal 
science do when its terminology becomes thus gummed? There is no other 
science which has quite the same degree of difficulty in immunizing its language. 
1016 
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a means of evidencing the dealings of men in every day life than it was 
shackled by all of these uses. The period of word ritual is not far back 
in our legal history.13 The "oath" hangs onto our procedure with unbe- 
lievable tenacity, and generations are required to rid our administration 
of any formalism. Nor do we seem to make much progress here.14 The 
succeeding stages of rules and principles and doctrines, with their form- 
ulas and standards reduced to well polished phrases, are still dominating 
our law. Probably these are even now at high tide. To this array of 
theological methods we have added classification and analysis, the de- 
ductive and inductive processess of logic. And with these as a basis 
have come attempts at perfecting a mechanics of symbols by which our 
rules may be made to work as precisely as the devices of numbers.15 All 
of these have their utility, but the first requisite of intellectual freedom, 
and as much so in the study of the science of law as elsewhere, is a 
wholesome fear of words. 
Fortunately for the common law there are strong currents which 
tend to sweep its channels clear as fast as the crystallization brought 
about by words threatens to choke them. The common law system of 
administration at first had no adequate machinery for preserving with 
certainy and precision the words of its judges. Their reported sayings 
were therefore quickly weakened when reporters were found in conflict 
or otherwise unreliable. Moreover, the vanity, and possibly sometimes 
the ignorance and errors, of succeeding judges which impelled them to 
improve upon the statements of their predecessors, have produced a 
great variety and conflict in rules. Even when the doctrine of stare 
decisis was thought to have been fastened on our system of law admin- 
istration, these and other forces were present to break up the crystalliza- 
tion of any such fantastic attempt at law petrifaction. The efforts at 
statute making were designed to furnish a dependable ally in this process 
and they doubtless would have done so except for the constant tinkerings 
of succeeding legislatures, together with the habits of judges, by this time 
confirmed, to interpret and refine both upon the statutes as well as upon 
their own interpretations and refinements. But of even greater potency 
as an antidote to word worship has always been the loose language of 
13 WIGMORE, VIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) ?? 1815, et seq., 2405, 2426; THAYER, 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 24, 390; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 
(1920) ?205. 
4 Professor Herman Oliphant gives a good instance: "A striking example 
of this is found in the fact that the legislature of Pennsylvania has enacted Pro- 
fessor Williston's draft of a uniform law, making any written release or promise 
valid and enforcible if the writing also contains an additional express statement 
that the signer intends to be legally bound." (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 348. But 
see explanation by Professor Williston. Ibid. 554. 
" Hohfeld's analysis is essentially such a scheme. Professor Kocourek's recent 
book, JURAL RELATIONS (1927), is a most elaborate scheme of this sort. 
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contemporary judges. So that with the facilities now at hand for writ- 
ing, publication, and distribution of judicial essays on the cases adjudged 
by courts, together with the numerous adventures in legislation, the in- 
creasing range given to administrative officers outside the courts, the 
more perfected technic of lawyers in closing the ways that judges would 
make use of in their rationalizations if the ways were left open, as well 
as of opening new and unheard of ways, the infinite number of judges 
and book makers-with all of these, the fear of a language serfdom 
grows more and more remote. In fact, the fear of many is that we are 
swinging far beyond the point of safety the other way in allowing to 
judges what in effect amounts to "free decisions."16 This movement is 
sought to be halted by the subsidizing of a vast amalgamation of legal 
scholarship, reinforced by a far reaching political organization to make 
the work of the scholars acceptable. But even the efforts of an Ameri- 
can Law Institute, as helpful to legal scholarship in particular, and to law 
administration in general, as it has already been and will continue to be, 
will prove fruitless in setting up a hierachy of rules and formulas. The 
day for that has gone. If such a movement should seem to succeed 
momentarily it is hardly to be expected that legislatures, judges and 
legal scholars will overcome the delightful habits of such long standing 
which impel them to seek changes in the order of things. 
Under whatever guise it has been undertaken, the search for a lan- 
guage technic which would solve the difficulties of government has been 
the falsest hope of legal scholarship. No natural or social science has found 
its secrets in words and phrases and neither will the science of law. 
"Words are extremely imperfect tools and nobody has ever succeeded 
in mastering real things by means of mere words" says Ehrlich.17 There 
is no such thing as words so plain that they are not to be interpreted. 
There are no premises to be found so certain that nothing more than an 
irrefutable logic is required. The emptiness of multitudinous terms which 
have served as major premises of judicial logic has long been exposed.18 
A process which assumes the very ends it is employed to discover will 
in the end betray its futility. It is not that a scientific language device is 
not desirable. It is merely that too much emphasis has been put upon it, 
and too much expected of it. The attempt has been made and still is made 
to make language do the service of judging itself. There can be no such 
substitution. Words are the machinery by which the power of thought is 
handled, but if there is no such power put into them the words are life- 
16 See Geny, Judicial Freedom of Decision; Its Necessity and Method, THE 
SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD (IX Modern Legal Philosophy Series, 1917) 15. 
Also Ehrlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, ibid. 47, 
69. 
17Ibid. 70. 
18See Cook, Scientific Method and the Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303. 
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less. In the administration of law, both the judge who surrenders this 
power to phrases as well as the judge who spends his time attempting to 
pattern phrases to control succeeding judges in the cases to come, can only 
do his science ill. His function primarily is to pass an acceptable judg- 
ment in the case before him. When the next case arises a different judg- 
ment may be desirable. But both judge and legislator seem more deeply 
concerned for the future than for the present, as though the future would 
not have its own lawgivers. The institution of government is sustained by 
the life of the day as are other institutions. We can no more make use of 
the power that flowed through the words of Coke and Blackstone and 
Marshall than we can of the life contemporary with that power. We use 
their words, but their utility depends upon the power we ourselves gen- 
erate. It could not be otherwise, nor is it to be regretted. As each day 
has its own problems, its own life to spend, it likewise will have its own 
language. Somehow or other thought has always found a way of artic- 
ulating itself, and in a voice sufficient for the time and place.19 There 
is no warrant for the fear that a fluid language and adjustable rules are 
undependable. We have never had any other sort, although we have 
lost much by not recognizing that fact. The point is that we have looked 
to the wrong source for dependability. We have sought it through a 
technic of language instead of a technic of judging. We rather trust the 
machinery than its engineers. 
A Judging Technic 
Probably lawyers would more widely agree upon the suggestion 
that the judge is the most responsible unit in our social structure-that 
his judgment is the most vital factor of law administration-than upon 
19HOLMES, RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1923) Introduction, p. 
xxx. "Any idea that has been in the world for twenty years and has not perished 
has become a platitude although it was a revelation twenty years ago. One might 
venture on the paradox that by the time a proposition becomes generally articulate 
it ceases to be true-because things change about as fast as they are realized." 
Wigmore, The Judicial Function, THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, op. cit. supra 
note 16, Preface p. xxvi, at p. xxxv: "If we recollect the differences of person- 
ality and community, and add to those the differences caused by lapse of time 
and change of environment, we shall realize that words are far from fixed 
things; they are the most fluent and indefinite of things." 
Ehrlich, op. cit. supra note 16, 47, 61: "No theory of the application of law 
can get around the difficulty that every body of formulated rules is in its very 
nature incomplete; that it is really antiquated the very moment it has been for- 
mulated. Consequently, it can hardly govern the present and never the future. 
No such theory will ever be able to prevent the perpetual course of evolution of the 
social institutions to which the law is applied, whereby the formulated rules of 
decisions are constantly obliged to deal with new subject-matters. And it will 
also never be possible to avoid the fact that the individuals intrusted with the 
application of the law, being children of their nation and their age, will apply the 
law in the spirit of their nation and their age. . . . The most solid theories and 
the most powerful legislation must alike be shattered upon the rock of such reali- 
ties." 
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any other suggestion which could be made. About him must be built 
any program designed to serve a science of law. The difficulty has been 
to insist upon a red-blooded judge in one breath and in another insist 
that he be controlled by a bloodless theology. It is one thing to rely on 
the infallibility of rules and doctrines; it is another to trust the affairs 
of men to the fallibility of men's judgment. It has required a long 
process of painful experimenting to drive home the dreaded fact-if it 
be even now driven home-that men must rely upon the judgment of 
men and make the best of it. Says so intelligent a philosopher as Morris 
Cohen: "To be ruled by a judge is, to the extent that he is not bound 
by law, tyranny or despotism. It may often be intelligent and benevolent, 
but it is tyranny just the same."20 The eternal gropings of men to find a 
source of their own control beyond themselves will not down. Is there 
no way to control the exercise of that power we hand over to our judges 
save by rules of law? These are but the trappings through which judg- 
ment is passed. The most thoughtful of men stick at this point and here 
they turn back into the wilderness of words.. But it is here than any ra- 
tional administration of law must make its boldest step. It is here that 
the aids furnished by the multiple forms of legal terminology break 
down. The judging capacity requires not merely a clerk who can match 
phrases. Phrases can state the issue upon which judgment must be 
passed but they cannot pass the judgment. At this point the judge 
finds himself out in life at large beyond any bounds that the terminology 
of legal science yet knows and it is out here that the judge must find the 
power which sustains thought and judgment; it is out here that he must 
employ the processes of intelligent men generally. This hitching up of 
law with life is a gap that must be bridged before any mature science of 
law can be developed. A technic of judging finds its chief support in the 
depths of culture and experience which lie beyond the crusted phrase- 
ology of the opinions of judges. The control of judges is not to be 
found in rules, but in the fact that they are men nourished on the same 
thoughts and other life-giving forces as the rest of us, and are subject to 
be influenced by the same factors in making their judgments as those 
which influence their fellows generally. Judges, as other men, are bound 
by the factors which have conditioned their growth.21 These are the 
20 Cohen, Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law (1927) 27 COLUM- 
BIA LAW REV. 237, 244-245. 2 Kohler: "We overlooked completely that the lawmaker is the man of his 
time, thoroughly saturated with the thoughts of his time, thoroughly filled with the 
culture that surrounds him, that he works with the views and conceptions which 
are drawn from his sphere of culture, that he speaks with words that have a cen- 
tury of history behind them and whose meanings were fixed by the sociological 
process of a thousand years of linguistic development, and not through the per- 
sonality of the individual." From Pound, Courts and Legislation, THE SCIENCE 
OF LEGAL METHOD, op. cit. supra note 16, 202, 224. 
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very forces, which in turn determine the rules themselves that men utter. 
Could we but discover and articulate these factors we should know the 
limits of law itself. 
Before such inquiry is made let the discussion take another turn. 
How do judges employ this power we call law? How do judges pass 
judgment? Has any one ever disclosed? It would seem that with the 
numberless judgments passed and the laborious efforts which judges 
have made to disclose the judgment-passing secret, there could be no 
mystery. But the processes of judgment are as obscure as the processes 
of thought. We think. (At least we say we do.) We judge. After we 
-have judged we make use of all sorts of devices to indicate the lines our 
processes have followed in reaching judgment. We employ numberless 
mediums of expression. It is these that many minds grasp and fondle as 
though they themselves hid the secret of judging and by some process of 
.devotion could be made to give up their secret. You have observed 
those who cling to the words of the judge as though they possessed some 
.occult power to determine other judgments. And possibly they do have 
some such power for the occult judge. There is no gainsaying that the 
formulas in which judgments have been couched have been highly im- 
portant factors in men's dealings. Along with other uses they serve as 
storage cells for a legal science. They range from the tiniest one-cell 
order to those of the highest multiples. But how are these formulas 
themselves produced? How are they charged with this power of law? 
We seldom go behind them; we begin with them. We have our rules, 
,our doctrines, our rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, etc., but 
where did we get them, and why do we use them as we do ? When we 
-say in a particular case that plaintiff had a right, defendant was under a 
-duty, and the like, this but means that we have already passed judgment. 
We are merely using these terms to pronounce the judgment passed. 
The process has been concluded in some unknown way; the result is 
merely being vocalized. We play around with our legal technic, make 
use of our robust phrases, as though they disclosed the secret of our 
judgment. But it is a rare thing that an opinion acknowledges the forces 
which must have impelled the judgment pronounced. 
But I do not say that judgment is any less wise or dependable on 
account of this fact. It may be that the precision of the automaton is 
more to be risked than any attempt to handle factors far too numerous 
and elusive to be brought under conscious control. The conception of 
life may be instantaneous; the passing of judgment may only require an 
instant's focus. I do not know about this. But I am quite sure that as 
lawyers we constantly delude ourselves and likewise delude others by in- 
:sisting that those delightful word jousts we call opinions are dependable 
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guides to the workings of the judicial processes. When that stage is 
reached, the action has already been fought. An opinion is but the 
smoke which indicates the grade of mental explosive employed. Some- 
where behind the curtains of legal expression lie the laboratories of our 
intelligence. They are not legal. They comprise all we are. Perhaps 
our judgments on the least item of the day are given shape there in the 
same way as our most solemn decision in a law suit. There lie our con- 
centration centers as it were. There we do our work. A thousand 
flashes from all quarters answer our calls for power. Out of it all comes 
a judgment. Can we articulate these flashes. I hesitate to assert that we 
can, and even more so to make an attempt in that direction. 
The Judging and Language Technics in Negligence Cases. 
In the class of cases known as "negligence cases" a working analysis 
has been rather widely adopted which will serve our purposes here. Such 
a case has four elements: (1) the right-duty element; (2) the negligence 
element; (3) the damage element; and (4) the causal relation element. 
Ordinarily two judgment-passing agencies are employed in these cases- 
the judge and jury. The appellate court is left out of the picture as such, 
but of course it is a very important factor, and must be considered as a 
"part" of the "judge." Its function is primarily to say what the trial 
judge should have done. This dual tribunal-requires an allocation of 
functions. And it is generally agreed that the problems arising under 
the right-duty element are for the judge, while the problems of negli- 
gence, damages and causal relation, if there is an issue raised as to them 
by the evidence, are for the jury under instructions. The writer has else- 
where dealt with the problems presented by the negligence and causal 
relation elements.22 The inquiry here is limited to the right-duty element. 
Here, if at all, we may expect to find crystallized rules upon which re- 
liance can be placed. 
The theology of the lawyer is not different from that of the saint. 
Nor can it be avoided; we can only hope for a better brand. The pass- 
ing of judgment in bulk in such a complicated matter as a law suit is a 
dangerous thing. Our thought processes are not a vigorous lot. They 
cannot be trusted in emergencies. They have little daring. Their weak- 
ness makes them cling to the very shells of words. Note the sameness 
of an author's writings; the monotonous repetitions in a series of opin- 
ions by the same judge; the reproduction and glossing for a generation 
of the two or three best opinions on any subject. Hence, on account 
22See my book, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) and my articles, 
The Negligence Issue (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1029; Contributory Negligence and 
Proximate Cause (1927) 6 N. C. L. REV. 3. 
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of our weakness, we cultivate analysis and classification, logic and all 
of its processes, both as aids to judgment and to its articulation. How- 
ever faulty these may be, we find them essential to our science. 
Now it is clear that when the theology of a negligence case is swept 
aside all that is involved is that there must be a concurrence of judg- 
ment in plaintiff's favor both by judge and jury before a defendant is 
required to pay the loss. The machinery for obtaining this concurrence 
of judgment is most troublesome; it requires the analysis indicated 
above. The judge passes his judgment on so-called questions of law- 
rights and duties; the jury on so-called questions of fact-negligence, 
damage, and causal relation. The judge is the dominant factor in this 
arrangement. He not only passes his judgment first, but determines in 
what cases the jury can properly pass a judgment at all,23 as well as 
indicates some of the considerations which should be taken into account 
by the jury in passing judgment. The determination in a particular 
case of what problems shall be decided by judge and what by jury is 
not always easy. Here in this first preliminary judges make serious 
errors. It is frequently much easier to decide the case than it is to de- 
termine whether the jury shall have any part in its decision. In fact 
this dual arrangement is a most difficult one in practice-the least 
understood and most costly device of law administration. 
In passing his own judgment, the judge may frame his problems in 
a variety of forms: (1) Was the defendant under a duty, and if so, 
was he under a duty to plaintiff? or (2) Was plaintiff's interest pro- 
tected against defendant's conduct? or (3) Plaintiff having invoked some 
general rule, was such rule designed to give protection to plaintiff's inter- 
est? or (4) Was such rule designed to protect plaintiff's interest 
against such a risk as the defendant's conduct in the particular case? In 
another type of case it may take the form of whether defendant's con- 
duct makes a prima facie case for plaintiff, or whether defendant's con- 
duct was privileged or justifiable. But however framed, the issue is 
the same; the court must say whether there is any "law" which would 
require defendant to bear the risk or whether plaintiff must bear 
his own loss. Expressed more directly, the judge must decide whether 
Minturn, J., in Morril v. Morril, 142 Atl. 337, 339-340 (N. J. L. 1928): 
"Hence it becomes imperative before legal liability for conceded damages can be 
imposed upon a defendant, for the court in the first instance to inquire and de- 
termine the character of duty which the law under the facts imposed upon the 
defendant as the basis of liability; for manifestly it cannot be conceded that the 
jury from their inner consciousness may evolve in every variety of tortfeasance a 
legal duty as the standard of liability. The rule of legal duty or the standard of 
human conduct under any given circumstances must be declared by the court as 
a preliminary to the submission of the case to the jury, and, if upon the conceded 
facts no rule of legal duty can be said to have been transgressed, legal liability 
cannot be said to supervene so as to warrant the submission of the case to the 
jury." See Meyer v. Benton, 74 N. J. L. 533, 65 Atl. 1023 (1907). 
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he would be willing to see the risk placed on defendant even though the 
jury should find affirmatively on this question. All of this assumes, of 
course, that the jury's judgment is yet to be passed, and that such judg- 
ment may or may not concur in any phase of the matter left to the jury. 
Assuming it is not a pattern case how does the judge know whether there 
is any such "law"? How does he know how to pass judgment? How 
does he know what protection to give to plaintiff's interest? Inasmuch 
as this inquiry has come to be normally expressed in terms of "duties," 
let us think of this problem in these terms. Was the defendant under a 
duty to plaintiff? We shall be fortunate if we do not lose our direction 
at the outset even in this small run-way of words. 
How does the stating of the problem in terms of duties enable a 
judge to pass judgment? Where shall he find the source of duties? Do 
judges find them ready made? Do they assume them? Do they create 
them, and if so, do they create them in wholesale, or must each court 
create a particular duty which fits the particular case then before it? So 
far as I have been able to discover, the common law courts have stum- 
bled through the whole period of their existence without committing 
themselves on this inquiry. Perhaps it is a subject which is not to be 
talked about. We are clearly dealing with the very processes by which 
law is generated. And doubtless the questions as to the paternity of 
these duties brought forth in case after case is embarrassing enough at 
best. 
It would be as futile to attempt to state for the judge the limits 
of the law's protection in advance of the particular conduct, as it would 
be to state for the jury the sort of conduct they should condemn. Con- 
duct is infinite in its variety. The most a legal science can do with the 
classes of cases here involved is to employ broad formulas both for 
judge and jury and rely upon their respective judgment-passing capacity 
to dispose of the cases satisfactorily as they arise.24 But judges are slow 
24 See discussion on this point in my article, The Negligence Issue, supra note 
22. Dean Pound's observation with reference to legislation is equally applicable: 
"It is a lesson of all legal history that the most we may achieve in advance is to 
lay down a premise or a guiding principle and that the details of application must 
be the product of judicial experiment and judicial experience." Pound, op. cit. 
supra note 21, 227. 
Judge Cardozo gives the proper dimensions: "The endless variety of the proc- 
ess is indeed a source of never-ceasing wonder. One would suppose after all these 
centuries of judging that the frontier would have vanished, that there would no 
longer be unsettled soil, no longer nebulae and star dust, but only peopled worlds. 
Yet in truth it is not so. There are topics where the law is still unformed and 
void. ... I am struck by this from day to day in the course of my judicial work. 
I am struck by it again when following the work of the American Law Institute 
in the restatement of the law. One cannot have a part, however humble, in the 
execution of that project without a mounting sense of wonder that with all our 
centuries of common law development, with all our multitudinous courts and still 
more multitudinous decisions, there are so many questions, elementary in the sense 
of being primary and basic, that remain unsettled even now. ... I have noticed 
this particularly in connection with the law of torts...." CARDOZO, THE PARA- 
DOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 76, 77. 
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to confess even to themselves that the administration of law rests on 
so uncertain a foundation. We are eager to believe that this is a 
"government of laws and not of men." We are pained when we come 
face to face with the fact that there is nothing more stable in our civili- 
zation than the common fund of desires, habits and intelligence of 
ourselves and our neighbors. And we refuse to believe that the power 
of passing society's judgment on the every-day affairs of society can be 
safely intrusted to the men whom we select as judges. 
Duties are usually stated in broad terms. In negligence cases thistakes 
the form of the"duty to use reasonable care." This means little. Even 
when it is said that a person owes a"duty to use reasonable care (for ex- 
ample) towards other travellers on the highway," or "duty to provide a 
reasonably safe place for a servant to work," and the like, these are little 
more than pious aphorisms. Nothing more has been stated than that some 
interests of travellers on the highway and some interests of a servant 
are given protection by organized society-government. But what inter- 
ests and how much protection, or what specifically is required of respec- 
tive defendants, are in no way indicated. Something is still lacking. We 
must say that plaintiff's interest in his bodily integrity or in his vehicle 
as a traveller on the highway is protected against defendant's conduct 
in driving too fast, or failing to give or obey traffic signals, or driving 
a car without good brakes, etc., before we have stated a graspable prop- 
osition. In other words, we must say that defendant is under a duty to 
plaintiff to drive at a reasonable speed, give or obey signals, have good 
brakes, etc. And even here the pattern is barely suggested; the cloth 
is still uncut. We have not yet stated that a particular plaintiff has 
protection against a particular defendant's conduct, or that a particular 
defendant owes a particular plaintiff any specific duty. And what is more 
remarkable, we can never say these things, save in the rarest cases, prior 
to the time the conduct to be passed upon has transpired and is presented 
in an actual case in court. Aside from those few cases where duties 
have been stated in terms of conduct, the duty a defendant was under, 
or the protection a plaintiff was entitled to have, is unknowable until 
the case has been adjudged. And it is here that we ask, how are these 
duties of defendants ascertained? And how are they to be stated until 
they are ascertained? 
The general duties stated in terms of "reasonable care" and similar 
abstractions are not difficult to state, but when they are so stated they 
go very little distance in giving aid to the judge in the particular case. 
The judge very quickly arrives at the point where he must say whether 
the generalization is applicable to the particular case; whether plain- 
tiff is entitled to any protection under it; whether defendant was under 
any duty with respect to the conduct that transpired, and the interest 
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which was injured. How can a judge know this? How can a judge 
say there was a duty in this case and not in that one? This is the first 
problem in any case. In the "mine run" of cases it may not be so very 
difficult because other more or less similar cases have blazed trails. But 
how did it happen that the trails were so blazed? The countless va- 
rieties of conduct make this problem constantly fresh. Let it be said 
again that this is the dimmest part of tort law, perhaps of all law. It 
presents the hardest problems in any field. It is the most important; it 
is the one at which judges quail; it is the one which is most frequently 
hidden in a mysticism of words. 
The Test of Duty 
Here there is frequent resort to those numerous "tests" of duties 
which have been evolved for various types of cases.25 For the most part 
these have been devised for the judge's own aid, though in some in- 
stances, judges have cleverly deceived themselves into believing that by 
certain devices they can get assistance from juries at this point, and 
some of these devices are the merest rules of thumb, or possibly even 
smoke screens for the particular case. Certainly there is no censure 
for a particular judge's "grabbing at straws" when there has been no 
serious attempt to formulate rational bases of judgment at this point. 
1. Affirmative conduct. The most definite boundary of negligence 
law is the line between affirmative and negative conduct.26 Broadly 
25 These tests are found in many cases and are phrased in all sorts of fashions. 
A few of them are indicated here: SPENCER, FORMULA OF JUSTICE (1891) ? 27: 
"Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal 
freedom of any other man." 1 COMYNS DIGEST (1780) 128: "In all cases, where 
a man has a temporal loss, or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an 
action upon the case to be repaired in damages." Wolf v. Des Moines Elevator 
Co., 126 Iowa 659, 664, 98 N. W. 301, 302 (1905): "No man shall make use of 
his own property in such manner as to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment 
on the part of others of the rights conferred upon them by law." This generaliza- 
tion is stated in numerous ways. One of the most interesting is found in Barger 
v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 440, 66 S. E. 439, 442 (1909): "The ancient maxim 
of the common law, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, is not founded in any 
human statute, but in that sentiment expressed by Him who taught good will 
toward men and said, 'Love thy neighbor as thyself.' Freely translated, it en- 
joins that every person, in the use of his own property, should avoid injury to 
his neighbor as much as possible." 
26See Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts 
(1905) 53 AM. L. REG. 209, 237, 377; STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 33. 
"It is surprising to find that every attempt to announce either judicially or in text- 
books any inclusive affirmative principle of the origin of the duty of care, the 
primary fundamental requisite, has been unsuccessful." Ibid. pp. 209 and 33 
respectively. 
"There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more 
fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between active mis- 
conduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a failure to take 
positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created by any 
wrongful act of the defendant." Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis 
of Tort Liability (1908) 56 U. OF PA. L. REV. 217, 219, 316; STUDIES IN THE LAW 
OF TORTS 291, 294. 
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speaking no person is under a duty to another unless he has entered 
upon some course of conduct towards such other. As long as a person 
does nothing he comes under no duty imposed by law. This is one of 
the most dependable limitations upon duties, but it is a limitation seldom 
required to be made. Probably after all we are merely saying that in 
the tort field at least this power we call law is merely designed to control 
conduct and not to compel it. We have enough to do to keep our ac- 
tivities within control, without attempting to regulate the directions the 
latent energies of individuals should take. But the line of affirmative 
conduct has not always been easy to draw.27 By taking a view at too 
close range courts have sometimes reached results wholly out of line 
with the views of society at large. Take for instance the case in which 
defendant runs into plaintiff with an automobile or train and seriously 
hurts him without the violation of any duty to plaintiff. Does de- 
fendant then owe plaintiff a duty to stop and render assistance? Courts 
have held not.28 But it ought to be clear that a defendant in such case 
is not in the position of one who had merely done nothing as in the 
case of a defendant who stands by and sees a baby run over or a blind 
man walk off a cliff when defendant could rescue either without danger 
to himself. On the contrary, the defendant has affirmatively hurt the 
plaintiff and in so far as affirmative conduct is concerned, defendant 
is well inside the lines. He may well not have violated any duty to 
plaintiff in hurting him, but the fact remains that he did hurt plaintiff. 
Now the question is entirely different. Having hurt plaintiff should the 
law impose a duty upon defendant to take further steps to render aid to 
his victim?29 Why should it? Why should it not? The assumptions 
made by the courts generally preclude this most important question. 
Likewise it has been assumed that a landowner for some reason is 
beyond the line of affirmative conduct with reference to those who come 
on his land and into contact with the dangerous instrumentalities which 
he employs there. In other words, it has been assumed with reference 
to the use of his land that the landowner is not subject to the duties 
which another person incurs by using his chattels. In most jurisdictions 
27 See Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 
supra note 26. For citation of authorities see (1928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 765. 
2Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281 (1903); Note (1903) 
69 L. R. A. 513. See recent case of Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N. E. 301 (Mass. 
1928). 
See Ames' suggestion, Law and Morals (1908) 22 HARV. L. REV. 97; SE- 
LECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 17. Also Bohlen's argument in 
his book, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 339. Numerous statutes now re- 
quire a motorist who has a collision with another person to stop, give information 
disclosing identity, etc., and to render aid if the other person's condition requires 
it. The common law courts seem to have been frightened away at this point for 
fear they would be invading the precincts of morals, as if legal protection is not 
to be influenced by moral considerations. 
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the assumption has been repudiated as to young children. Why were 
duties not always imposed on landowners in these cases? But of equal 
importance why do some courts now impose such duties ?30 Whatever the 
reasons may be for not imposing responsibility in these cases it is not be- 
cause such landowners are without the lines of affirmative conduct. 
2. The "danger" test. But the line between affirmative and passive 
conduct being conceded as a possible one, when will duties be imposed 
upon affirmative conduct and to what extent? After all, this is the 
heart of the inquiry. 
Brett, M. R., in Heaven v. Fender made the most impressive attempt 
to answer this puzzling question. His formula runs like this: "When- 
ever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard 
to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own con- 
duct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger or in- 
jury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary 
care and skill to avoid such danger."31 His brothers on the bench would 
have none of his generalization. Brett, himself, repudiated it when at- 
tempted to be used in other than personal injury cases.32 But even 
though the rankest dictum, it has sufficed as a rationalization of duties 
in hundreds of cases. It has come to be known as the "danger" test of 
duty. Whenever defendant's conduct threatens danger there is a duty 
to take care. It thus would seem to serve as an adjustable test ready for 
all purposes. 
30For a long time the "Turntable" or "Attractive Nuisance" doctrine was 
thought to be anomalous. Although many courts recognized it in some form it 
was placed on the most fantastic grounds. So able a writer as Jeremiah Smith 
vigorously opposed the doctrine. Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children En- 
tering Without Permission (1898) 11 HARV. L. REV. 349, 434; SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1924) 357. In recent years the doctrine has become well 
established in most jurisdictions. See Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal 
Courts (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 826; SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1924) 397; Green, Landowner v. Intruder: Intruder v. Landowner-Basis of Re- 
sponsibility in Tort (1923) 21 MICH. L. REV. 495. Both writers agree, and find 
some support in the cases, that the landowner as any other person is to be governed 
by the usual requirements to exercise ordinary care in the use of his property. 
This was assumed as the basis of the very first case, Sioux City & Pac. R. R. v. 
Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S. 1873). But the courts have given practically no 
grounds as to why this should be so. Although the doctrine is sound it cannot yet 
be said to have struck bottom. Notice how one of the better recent cases glides 
over the troublesome point. Clark v. Longview Pub. Service Co., 255 Pac. 380 
(Wash. 1927); (1928) 28 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 249. Even so able a judge as 
Justice Holmes seems unable to reach the heart of the problem. United Zinc & 
Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299 (1922). Judged by the 
opinions, there are few situations where the emotions seem to have played so large 
a part, and where an appraisal of the factors and interests involved has been 
given so small a part. 
11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883). 
82Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491. 
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Here is probably the strangest chapter in all tort law. Upon an- 
alysis it is clear that this formula is identical with the "foreseeability" 
or "anticipation of harm" formula. In fact, it is nothing more than the 
foreseeability test of "negligence," which, when spelled out, depends 
upon the utility of the "man of ordinary prudence" as a standard of 
measurement.33 These are the test and standard by which juries de- 
termine the negligence issue, i.e., the violation of duty. Now it would be 
passing strange if (1) the delimination of the law's protection, duty 
vel non, is to be passed over to the jury. That would end any possible 
hope of law crystallization; there can be no such thing as statement or 
restatement of the law where the jury must pass judgment; the very 
purpose of jury trial is to give a new deal in each case. But (2) it 
would be stranger still if the law should provide the judge with the same 
formula for use in determining the existence of duty as it gives to the 
jury for the determination of the violation of duty. Yet to all appear- 
ances this is exactly what has taken place. Incidentally, the very same 
test is repeatedly insisted on as the test of causal relation also.34 Thus 
it would seem that analysis has played itself false, so that a case is seem- 
ingly to be subjected thrice to the ponderous process of the "foresee- 
ability" formula. 
But fortunately no such thing is true, nor can it be true. Courts 
sometimes say that in hard cases they call in the jury to determine this 
duty problem.35 They may think so, but doubtless they do nothing more 
than let the matter go by default. It happens in this wise: By virtue of 
the fact that the judge is the dominant factor of the dual tribunal set 
up for these cases, the moment a case is passed to the jury, that moment 
8 "The man of ordinary prudence" as an attempted objectification of a 
standard for determining the reasonableness of conduct based upon foreseeability, 
probable consequences, anticipation of harm, probability of harm, danger, etc., is 
fully discussed in my article, The Negligence Issue, supra note 22. See Bohlen's 
analysis, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in. 
Negligence (1901) 40 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 79, 86; also op. cit. supra note 29, 1, 9: 
"To constitute actionable negligence there must be: (1) A duty to the plaintiff 
to observe care. This depends upon the probability of injury if care be not taken. 
(2) A standard of care not observed (constituting the breach). This again de- 
pends upon the anticipation of probable danger...." The confusing of the two 
problems, duty and violation of duty (the judge's function with the jury's func- 
tion) is believed to be very hurtful. The writer for a long time accepted the same 
view. See my article, Are Negligence and Proximate Cause Determinable by 
the Same Test (1923) 1 TEX. L. REV. 242, 256. 
Ibid. 243; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) 177. 
86 See Bird v. St. Paul & Marine Fire Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86 
(1918). Also see HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 123; COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS (1921) 233-234. These eminent legal scholars are not discussing the de- 
fining of duties in so many words, but they are dealing with the problems involved 
in marking the limitations on legal protection in difficult situations. Their sug- 
gestions fall short of the whole story and perhaps are frequently taken to mean 
something different from what was intended. The adjustment is not an easy one 
to make clear. 
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the judge necessarily has ruled that there is a duty upon the defendant, 
who will be held responsible if the jury concurs in the case as presented 
to them. The jury's problem is ordinarily submitted at length under some 
variation of Brett's formula. In submitting this problem, the judge 
may think that he is shifting the whole burden to the jury. But he 
is not. He is at most merely allowing the case to be decided on the 
jury's problem without meeting his own squarely. But, of course, this 
very failure on his part necessarily operates as a ruling that there is a 
duty or else he never would have submitted the case to the jury at all. 
In other words, the judge passes on the existence of duty any way he 
may rule. If he consciously says there is no duty he will direct a verdict 
for defendant. If he consciously holds there is a duty he will submit 
the case to the jury on the negligence and other issues if there is any 
evidence raising them. But even though he tries to pass the question of 
duty to the jury, he cannot do so. The very passing automatically means 
that he has adjudged a duty to have obtained, and nothing but the jury's 
concurrence as to its violation is required in order to place responsibility 
on defendant. No other analysis of the respective functions of judge 
and jury will suffice, unless it be conceded that the jury alone has the 
power of determining the limits of protection which government is 
to give the interests of litigants. This would give to juries the power to 
fashion law in the most difficult cases. It would be a surrender of the 
highest power of the judicial process to the lay members of the court. 
It would render any statement of the rules of law impossible. But the 
answer is short-no such practice is recognized. When it comes to the 
pinch, whatever they may say, judges do not surrender this power. They 
may do curious things but this is not one of them. When a judge throws 
a question of this sort to a jury it is because he is willing to say that in 
his judgment plaintiff's interest should be protected, and defendant must 
pay the damage if the jury think his conduct violative of the standards 
which are recognized in such cases. 
The whole confusion comes about by the legal theology which re- 
quires substituting a symbolic phrase "determination of duty" for the 
judgment required of a judge in giving or denying the protection of 
government to the interest involved, and a like substitution of the figure 
of speech "violation of duty" for the jury's judgment giving or denying 
such protection. Thus our terminology gets in the way. In the cases 
which the judge thinks are clear he relies on his judgment alone at this 
point, but if he thinks the matter doubtful, our theory of the judicial 
process in tort cases requires the concurrence of the jury. But the 
jury's power is that of a concurrence or veto only. The jury's power 
is only exclusive in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the eviden- 
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tiary data relied on to sustain the claim. Here it may be that juries 
often exercise a far greater power than they should, due to the difficul- 
ties of separating their functions under a general verdict. But this is a 
perversion of power similar in all things to a judge's misuse of his power 
in holding a doubtful case to be a clear one involving no question for 
the jury. His functions of saying (1) there is no evidence to go to a 
jury and (2) that even though there is evidence, the law clearly gives 
no protection in such a case, allow the widest exercise of the judicial 
power. Good sense and the political powers of government are the 
only checks against its abuse. 
Nevertheless, the "danger" test of duty has great currency. In 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,36 Cardozo, J., accepted Brett's gen- 
eralization as a principle by which to hold the manufacturer of automo- 
biles to the duty to inspect in behalf of the ultimate user of the automo- 
bile. "Because the danger is to be foreseen there is a duty to avoid 
the injury," he said. In Glanzer v. Shepard37 the same great judge uses 
the same test of duty in order to hold a public weigher employed by the 
seller responsible to the buyer for a shortage in weight of beans. He 
thus extended the generalization to cover a class of injuries which Brett 
himself had refused to include on the ground that the rule was to be 
restricted to personal injuries.38 Very recently he has again phrased 
the rule: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within 
the range of apprehension."39 After a wide survey of the cases the Torts 
Restatement group of the American Law Institute have accepted this 
test, and it would seem therefore an accepted major premise of "negli- 
gence" law.40 
It is with great deference and hesitance that I suggest the inaptness 
of any such test, however heartily I agree with the results reached in the 
cases mentioned and other cases like them. It seems entirely too mis- 
leading, and this, even as a shorthand expression under which to sub- 
sume the numerous factors which impel judgment. To eliminate dangers 
and hurts is, of course, one of the chief ends of law; such is the prime 
purpose of tort law. But the use of so wide a variable as this as a part 
of a language technic, either for clarifying the issues for judgment or 
8 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916). The large part which the idea of dan- 
ger plays in this opinion can only be appreciated by reading it. 
7233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922). Many types of cases are catalogued 
in this excellent opinion as giving support to the same basis of duty. 
38 Le Lievre v. Gould, supra note 32. 
9 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 162 N. E. 99 (N. Y. 1928). 40 See TORTS RESTATEMENT, PRELIMINARY DRAFT No. 20 (Am. L. Inst. 1928) 
? 166. Here the phrase "unreasonable risk" is substituted for "dangerous conduct" 
and similar phrases. See also Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective (1927) 
41 HARV. L. REV. 1. 
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for rationalizing judgment after it is passed, seems inapt to say the least. 
It is well enough to use this test as a formula to pass the case to the 
jury for their judgment. There it is ritual. It serves well as a graphic 
method of stimulating the layman's consideration. He can pass his 
judgment as well under it as any other formula. But in calling for the 
judge's judgment in defining duties, why should that judgment be re- 
stricted by any such formula ? There are numerous factors on which the 
mind of the judge must be focused before he can declare this judgment, 
and such a formula would seem designed to obscure them by too great 
a vividness concentrated upon one factor only. 
No doubt the great emphasis which is given to the "danger" concept 
is because it graphically brings into play the factor of "experience," the 
greatest factor in all judgments, whether by lay or law judges. While 
great store has always been laid by experience, society has never given 
itself over to it entirely. Experience is too conservative, while society 
constantly calls for experiment and growth. Experience means in large 
part imitation, and life refuses to subject itself to imitation in all things.41 
Courts have not as a matter of fact been controlled by the prospect of 
danger. On the other hand, they are constantly putting approval on 
conduct despite its dangers. Other factors are more compelling. Judge 
Cardozo himself is one of the first to recognize this fact. In his recent 
Carpentier Lectures he says: 
"We build skyscrapers, though smaller dwellings might be safer for 
the builders. We run railroads, though lives might be saved if we were 
satisfied to travel slowly. We experiment with airplanes, though pilots 
run the risk of death .... The law will not prevent the erection of sky- 
scrapers. It may call for safety devices that will reduce the toll of lives. 
The law will not prevent the operation of railroads. It may call for sig- 
nals and watchmen, and may raise or depress the roadbed at the crossing 
of a highway."42 
He might have added much more. We give to the users of automo- 
biles all the protection given to other persons, in the face of steadily in- 
creasing losses of life and limb.43 We employ explosives, give our chem- 
ists and other scientists the widest latitude in their experiments, even 
though human life must pay the bill. In brief the law of negligence 
1 ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING (1927) 59-68. 
42 CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 24, 57, 59. 
43Over a seven year period from Jan. 1, 1919 to Dec. 31, 1927, 137,017 per- 
sons were killed by automobiles in the United States, and during the same period 
approximately 3,500,000 injured by the same source. See Lattin, Vicarious Liability 
and the Family Automobile (1928) 26 MICH. L. REV. 846, 866. But in face of 
such facts the automobile is not outlawed. Courts merely invent a "family pur- 
pose" doctrine, extend a "negligence per se doctrine" and similar devices, while 
the legislatures require examination for licenses, registration of cars, compulsory 
insurance, and the like. Danger has never stopped a useful invention. 
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could very properly be called the law of the dangerous machine. Surely 
if danger were now made the test of duties, our activities would be 
speedily curtailed. 
In the same case in which the user of an automobile was allowed to 
recover from the manufacturer because of personal injuries caused by a 
defective wheel,44 the same court would have denied recovery for the 
injury to the automobile itself, though it was a hundred times more 
"foreseeable" that there would be hurt to it and consequently to plain- 
tiff's pocket-book, than that his person would be hurt.45 The same 
court would not defeat a person who rushed in front of a speeding train 
to save a child,46 or walked a dangerous trestle to aid a comrade.47 The 
same able judge says in such a case: "Danger invites rescue. The cry 
of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these re- 
actions of the mind . . . . The emergency begets the man."48 Courts 
applaud here as does all mankind. Danger we should like to eliminate, 
but not at too great a price. The factors which control the judgment of 
judges in placing the risks first upon one party and then upon another in 
the growing variety of cases which the activities of men are constantly 
presenting to courts must be found elsewhere. 
3. Suggested determinants of duty. What are these factors which 
control judgment in defining duties? We can scarcely defer a conclusion 
longer. 
It would seem that the process of identifying and delineating those 
factors is a first requisite in any serious effort to deal with the adminis- 
tration of this power to judge through which we seek to control our 
affairs. And that they do not differ in any great degree from those 
which control the like power of judgment in other affairs which we nor- 
mally think of as outside the scope of government is constantly be- 
coming clearer. In short, the concept of law is defined by the limits of 
governmental activity merely for the sake of convenience. The usages, 
customs and mores in all realms of society, from the least obligatory to 
the most obligatory (short of the stage when they are given cognizance 
in the judgments of courts, but which may be equally constraining in 
their respective realms) are doubtless controlled by the same factors as 
the judgments we call law judgments. The term law is merely a term 
which is most generally used to indicate governmental control, as opposed 
to other sorts of control. But law, as power to subject people to control 
Supra note 36. 
41 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1923) ? 244; Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston 
Blocking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N. E. 454 (1921). 
4Eckert v. Long Island R. R., 43 N. Y. 502 (1871). 
4Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921). 
8 Ibid. 
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by passing judgment, is no different in government from what it is in 
church, in fashion, in that mass of every day relations which prevail 
throughout human society. The disputes about the nature of law and 
the attempts to differentiate it from usage and custom49 would seem 
to be of little avail. What is the end to be served ? Law as an instru- 
ment of formal government is understandable. Law as a means for use 
by a church or other organization is understandable. Law as existing in 
customs, usages and mores which more formal government takes for 
granted, is understandable. But it is one and the same power wherever 
found, indivisible and ungraspable. The difficulty is not with the na- 
ture of this power. The difficulty comes in our attempt to draw dis- 
tinctions in units of power, when all that we mean is the difference in the 
uses made of that power. Hence, my suggestion is that law, wherever 
found, is in turn controlled by factors largely common to all sorts of 
administration, whether of formal government or other forms of group 
activity. I realize that to name these factors is to encourage disputes 
as to the proper terminology. That cannot be avoided and I would not 
avoid it, for the factors are not objective and neither are the meanings of 
words. What will mean most to one, will mean least to another. There 
is neither hope nor need for a standardized terminology which will suf- 
fice for longer than the hour. The life of expression is no different 
from life in other forms. Usage, of course, is the means through which 
both words and classification grow, and develop symmetry; likewise it 
is the way of their death. 
The following are believed to be the factors of most significance in 
influencing the determination of duties and through them the limits of 
the protection afforded by law. There are doubtless others: 
1. The administrative factor. 
2. The ethical or moral factor. 
3. The economic factor. 
4. The prophylactic factor. 
5. The justice factor. 
Each of these must be satisfied somewhat in every acceptable de- 
cision. No judgment can long prove acceptable which develops very 
great pressure at any one of these points. No one can be overstressed, 
though now one and then the other will seem to be dominant. If a hu- 
man desire or interest cannot be given protection without offending 
one or more of what might be called the "social senses" corresponding 
to these several factors, then it must go without protection; there is no 
duty to respect it. These "senses" as developed in judges and through 
'9 See ALLEN, LAW rN THE MAKING (1927) cc. 1 and 11. 
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the judicial process are therefore of the greatest importance. Their 
influence can be demonstrated in hundreds of cases. 
The Administrative Factor 
When it is sought to discover to what extent the purely pragmatic 
difficulties of operating our ponderous legal machinery affect the re- 
sults, the inquiry proves baffling. Only the more important considerations 
can be given attention here. In the first place, there is nothing so 
weighty with court-room government as the workability of a rule or a 
process. If a court is asked to extend its protection to a new interest or 
against an unusual hazard which threatens a well established interest, it 
will not do so if its attempt would appear to be unduly burdensome, 
expensive or vain. A court will not knowingly enter upon a course of 
dealing which it cannot finish, or that may bring down upon it an in- 
crease in business or a mass of problems which it is not prepared to 
handle. On the other hand, even though a rule or practice has become 
antiquated and no longer meets the requirements of business, ethics, or 
justice, if it works easily and judges understand its operation, they will 
hesitate to discard it for some improved practice not yet accepted gen- 
erally, even though the latter promises much greater utility. The cau- 
tion of courts is due primarily to this influence rather than to that over- 
stressed and purely theological notion represented by stare decisis. Or, 
stated differently, the doctrine of precedent is weighty, not so much 
because courts either dislike improvement or feel themselves bound 
by prior decisions, but because changes require all sorts of adjustments 
that cannot be anticipated. The troubles are not limited to the single 
case. This in part explains why legislation creates so much trouble for 
courts and why they have always found so many ways of discounting it. 
Each court invariably sets up its own scheme of things.50 It takes 
many years to extend this scheme of things to cover even the most im- 
Here we must think of a court as the judiciary of a single jurisdiction. 
By the phrase, "scheme of things," I mean the sum of the methods which a court 
employs in handling its business. It develops all sorts of doctrines and practices 
which make the "local law" of any state of extreme importance. One court will 
not recognize the "last clear chance" or the "negligence per se" doctrines, for in- 
stance, but will get all the results of such rules by some other doctrines. One 
court will have nothing to do with mandamus and certiorari except in the most 
restricted respect, while another court will promote their use as methods of re- 
view in important cases which cannot await the ordinary processes of appeal. 
One court will repudiate the third party beneficiary doctrine and get the same 
results through some theory of trusts. One court will adopt a theory of absolute 
ownership of oil and gas and spend years aligning its real property rules in ac- 
cord therewith; another will adopt a no-ownership theory and align its property 
rules in accord therewith. There are literally hundreds of these variations which 
in the aggregate constitute a court's methods, and every court has them in 
abundance. 
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portant groups of problems which come before it. In the meantime all 
sorts of changes are taking place in the world outside. Any considerable 
change in the court's "scheme" may require a re-examination and re- 
alignment of many doctrines, a process which cannot be completed for 
years. It is little wonder that opposition is encountered when the in- 
tegrity of the court's scheme of things is threatened by some new doc- 
trine or new practice, or new demand for relief. It was as a defense for 
use in this sort of predicament that the doctrine of stare decisis became 
established late in the nineteenth century as applicable to Substantive law 
principles. The short-sighted philosophy that thought government could 
be operated precisely by rules and doctrines and principles reached its 
maturity at that time, and judges, reflecting this general idea, sought by 
the means of the doctrine of stare decisis to crystallize them.51 This 
doctrine has never been needed, it can be obviated in any case, but it is 
sometimes embarrassing and frequently requires subtlety in order to 
avoid its effects.52 It creates infinitely more difficulties than it renders 
benefits.53 For one thing a court's scheme of things may become so 
51ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 49, 123-146, gives a most interesting development 
of the doctrine of precedent. Strangely enough during its formative period the 
doctrine was confined to procedural matters (ibid. 143-144). As late as 1833, 
Parke, J., in Mirehouse v. Rennell, 1 Cl. & Finn 527, 546, spoke of the doctrine 
merely as a "principle of decision" to be kept "steadily in view" (ibid. 145). 
See also POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 323 et seq. 52 ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 49, 148. Among other rules for interpreting pre- 
cedents he says, "It is for the court, of whatever degree, which is called upon to 
consider the precedent, to determine what the true ratio decidendi was." The 
ratio decidendi is all that is authoritative. 
53 Ibid. c. IV, 147. This chapter indicates the authority and operation of the 
doctrine. Note the elegant theological superstructure implied by the following 
gems from this chapter: 
"Let us remind ourselves of Sir George Jessel's simple principle, that prec- 
edents are employed in order to establish principles. Throughout the whole appli- 
cation of the law, the principles are primary and the precedents are secondary, 
and if we lose sight of this fact, the precedent beconies a bad master instead of a 
good servant. The business of a court in deciding any particular issue is to work 
its way by the inductive principle, which I have mentioned, to a rule" (ibid. 159). 
Quare: Why be so anxious about finding "principle"? But having found it why 
bother further with stare decisis? 
"The difference between authoritative and unauthoritative precept is only 
the difference between what is logically relevant and what is not. For underneath 
the whole elaborate structure of precedents in our courts lies a permanent 
foundation of fundamental legal doctrine. "It is a dangerous thing," says Coke, 
"to alter or shake any of the fundamental rules of the common law, which in 
truth are the main pillars and supporters of the fabrick of the commonwealth" 
(ibid. 164). 
"We say that he is 'bound' by the decisions of higher courts. But he is 
bound only at his own discretion, according to his own judgment. Nothing can 
make the process of 'binding' merely automatic and mechanical, for the judge 
has first to decide, according to his lights, whether the illustration is really op- 
posite to the principle he is seeking. The humblest judicial officer can disregard 
the most authoritative declaration of the House of Lords unless he considers that 
the precedent cited is 'on all fours.' It is therefore fallacious to regard the ap- 
plication of precedents in the courts as a mere functioning of machinery. It is 
1.036 
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ponderous in the course of time that the succeeding judges cannot pos- 
sibly know what their predecessors have done. Courts unwittingly re- 
verse themselves more often than otherwise, and doubtless they spend 
more time trying to maintain a consistency of decision than on any other 
one problem. Moreover, this feeling that a court must drag along the 
dead part of itself creates a psychological deadweight of tremendous im- 
port. 
Another phase of this matter enters here. The political organiza- 
tion of our court systems into inferior and superior branches works 
heavily against change and strongly for a status quo. The trial judge 
is the most important officer of government. There is no statesmanship 
so valuable as that of the trial judge who has the capacity for doing 
business without making that an end in itself. Government can pay too 
high a price for administration and citizens have always been afraid of 
judges who turn their power too decidedly to efficient business methods. 
Yet, poor trial judges furnish the business in large part for the appellate 
courts. Nevertheless, our court systems tend more and more to magnify 
the appellate judge and to belittle the trial judge. The latter ought to be 
the ablest and best trained man in the judiciary. But let a trial judge 
show evidences of capacity and shortly he will be elevated to the appellate 
bench, where he is of less value, although his burdens will be made 
easier and his income greater. The objectives of the two courts quickly 
diverge. The trial court is absorbed in law administration at first hand. 
The appellate court is so far removed from the real controversy that it 
more and more becomes concerned primarily with fashioning harmonious 
rules and doctrines for use by trial courts. This divergence is inescap- 
able. A theory of law which finds its roots in words and rules must 
necessarily have a court of final jurisdiction to interpret words and con- 
strue rules. This in turn necessitates a theology of precedent, and it 
also accounts for the fact that a fair adjustment of the particular case 
must be sacrificed, if need be, to the consistency of a legal doctrine. It 
is not at all remarkable, therefore, that in the final analysis, to lawyers 
in general, legal dogmas are dearer than either a just, ethical or prag- 
matic administration of law. It is worthy of note that the stare decisis 
doctrine did not mature until the maturity of the appellate court in its 
present day form. It is very clear that nothing less than a radical struc- 
a complex process, depending greatly upon the faculties of individual judges" 
(ibid. 164). 
"If it is true that precedents are employed only to discover principles, so it is 
true that principles are imployed only to discover justice. . . . This dominant 
purpose all precedents, all arguments, and all principles must subserve and when 
precedents do not help, enlightenment must be found elsewhere. .... To what, 
then, do the judges turn? To those principles of reason, morality, and social util- 
ity which are the fountain head not only of English law, but of all law" (ibid. 
167). 
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tural modification in the machinery of our court systems can reduce to 
a minimum the development of a theological notion of law.54 
But whatever may be the reasons, when a litigant asks a court to 
do some new thing which would break into the integrity of its own 
scheme of things, he must make a clear case and be able to show the 
way out before he even reaches a competing basis with a familiar method. 
Ease and certainty of performance are prime qualities of administration, 
rather than the net results. The most apparent antidote for these con- 
servative factors is found in the changing personnel of the judges. The 
largest single factor in administration of law after all is the personality 
of the judge. Says Ehrlich, "There is no guarantee of justice except 
the personality of the judge."55 All technics must submit to his own. 
All factors are given weight on his own personal scales. And there is no 
way to avoid this, nor should a way be sought. As an antidote it is 
indeed a mild one. It is most remarkable how similar are the reactions 
of judges and their contemporaries at large. There is not much danger 
of any judge being either likely or able to depart very far from the 
beaten path, and if so, there is little danger that he can influence others to 
follow him. The departures which are made are so few that the 
slightest ones are sometimes startling. And strange to say that after some 
"dangerous" judge has worn his life away dissenting and protesting 
and now and then getting his way, he comes to stand out in the affec- 
tions of succeeding generations as the one of his day and time who was 
worth while. With judges on the courts of final resort whose average 
age is over fifty years, the forces of conservatism should have gages 
enough. And yet the continuous processionals of both new judges and 
new problems work astounding changes even over a short period of 
twenty years. The examination and comparison of the reported cases 
over several of these periods disclose that despite the slowing down 
tendencies of all these administrative processes, the control of human 
conduct is constantly increasing both over widening fields and in dis- 
criminating details. 
The suggestions here made are reflected in numerous instances. 
The whole system of equity jurisdiction found its chief sustenance in 
64 In a recent address before the Association of American Law Schools, 
(1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 71, Professor Herman Oliphant urges "A Return to Stare 
Decisis." The weight of his argument, however, is rather lodged against what he 
terms stare dictis. This is nothing more than legal theology, and I subscribe to 
what he sees in the way of danger here. But I dare suggest that there is no 
stare decisis of the sort he describes to make a return to. On the other hand it 
seems to me that the whole force of his paper is a compelling argument against 
the vices of legal theology and the means through which it is perpetuated, includ- 
ing the major one of stare decisis. It may well be that Professor Oliphant was 
merely putting an old face on a new form. The courts have made this sort of 
thing highly respectable, and it has all kinds of diplomatic advantages. 
55 Op. cit. supra note 16, 65. 
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the timidity of common law judges towards giving the reliefs which 
a growing society demanded. In turn when the chancellors had created 
their own scheme of things they became obsessed with a similar timidity, 
and equity then became as stale as law. The common law judges were 
afraid that they would be "flooded with litigation" and find themselves 
unable to prevent fraudulent use of the court's machinery. Thus they 
closed the door as far as they could in defamation suits. The abortive 
development of slander,56 seduction,57 and this type of suit generally is 
clearly due to the court's fear of its own power. The courts denied re- 
covery for injuries resulting in death58 and then whittled away at every 
corner the statute which sought to correct this parsimonious develop- 
ment of tort law.59 For a long period they refused to allow recovery 
for the injuries produced through impairment of the physical body 
through nervous shock unless accompanied with physical impact,60 and 
denied protection to the injured consumer of a manufactured product 
in absence of privity of contract with the manufacturer.61 Only under 
the guise of protecting a "property" interest will most courts even now 
interfere to prevent hurt to some of the most valued interests of person- 
ality which are identified through the emotions.62 Due doubtless to 
the difficulty in framing a more drastic and yet workable formula, the 
progress which was being made in the field of deceit and halted prema- 
turely by Derry v. Peek,63 is just now getting well under way again.64 
And at this moment our highest court, apparently in fear that its business 
will grow beyond its capacity, takes every opportunity to let it be known 
in advance that it will have nothing to do with one of the great preventive 
remedies which the law has found-the power to declare the rights 
of parties before injury has taken place-the declaratory judgment.65 
61I STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) 278 et seq. 
67 Ibid. 268 et seq. 
68Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493 (1808); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y. 
& N. H. R. R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856). 
09See TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (2d ed. 1913) ? 32; Bloss v. 
Woodson Sanitarium Co., 5 S. W. (2d) 367 (Mo. 1928), N. Y. L. J. No. 86 
(July 12, 1928); Mellon v. Goodyear, 48 Sup. Ct. 541 (U. S. 1928). 6 Throckmorton, Danages for Fright (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 260; Bohlen, 
Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact (1902) 
50 AM. L. REG. 141; STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 252; Goodrich, Emo- 
tional Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 MICH. L. REV. 497. 6 Wilson, The New York Rule as to Nervous Shock (1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 
512, 515; (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 544; (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 151. 
62 See Note (1920) 14 A. L. R. 295; Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy 
(1891) 4 HARV. L. REV. 193; (1926) 10 MINN. L. REV. 55. 
6314 App. Cas. 337 (1889). 
64 International Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331 (1927); (1927) 12 
CORN. L. Q. 539; Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 
700 (1928); see (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1141. 
6Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 48 Sup. Ct. 507 (U. S. 1928). See 
Borchard, Declaratory Actions as "Case" or "Controversies" (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 
845. 
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Again and again some of our greatest judges have shown a hostility 
towards new methods of giving the law's protection, even after their 
utility has been demonstrated beyond a peradventure by other courts, 
which can be explained only on the theory that an institution like a 
court, as well as the individual human mind, may reach a stage in its 
development when it closes its books and lives alone on its accumulated 
wealth. 
A striking instance of how this factor of administration operates 
through a long line of cases is found in the "mental suffering" cases. 
As typical of the cases in which recovery was denied for injury re- 
sulting through fright caused by negligent conduct without physical im- 
pact is Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad. The court is very clear as 
to the basis of the decision: 
"It would seem therefore that the real reason for refusing damages 
sustained from mere fright must be something different; and it probably 
rests on the ground that in practice it is impossible satisfactorily to ad- 
minister any other rule .... The logical vindication of this rule is that it 
is unreasonable to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to antici- 
pate and guard against fright and the consequences of fright; and that 
this would open a wide door for unjust claims, which could not success- 
fully be met."6 
In a similar type of case, the New York Court of Appeals denied 
recovery, saying: 
"If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once estab- 
lished, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the 
injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection."67 
Holmes, C. J., in Homans v. Boston Elevated Railway,68 in approv- 
ing the denial of recovery in this class of case said: "It is an arbitrary 
exception based upon a notion of what is practicable." No other sus- 
tainable basis has been found for such holdings, and since the early 
scare of the courts has subsided, every sort of distinction is employed 
to get away from the rule in these states.69 
In the leading case of Hill v. Kimball70 permitting a recovery in 
this type of case, the court considered the whole matter closed when it 
concluded that there could be physical injury through fright. That 
e 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N. E. 88, 89 (1897). 
67 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 110, 45 N. E. 354 (1896). 
6180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N. E. 737 (1902). 
69 Clemm v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 268 Pac. 103 (Kan. 1928); Conley v. United 
Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238, 105 N. E. 975 (1914); White Sewing Machine Co. v. 
Leisel, 162 N. E. 633 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1928); McLeod v. Linde Air Products 
Co., 1 S. W. (2d) 123 (Mo. 1927). See Wilson, op. cit. supra note 61. 70 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890). 
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there should be a recovery for such physical injury if it were in fact 
a result of the fright was assumed. Other courts followed this lead but 
it was not until the Court of King's Bench in Dulieu v. White & Sons,71 
repudiated the holding of the Privy Council72 that much advance was 
made in extending liability in this direction. Even in that great case, 
after the court had done with refuting the argument in cases like Lynn 
v. Spade, it is in vain that one looks for some affirmative basis for the 
decision. Assuming that the rule allowing recovery in such cases could 
be administered satisfactorily, why should such a duty be placed upon 
a defendant? Doubtless there are many good reasons, but they are 
withheld. In the late case of Hambroke v. Stokes Bros.73 in which the 
English court extended the rule of the Dutieu case74 so as to allow 
plaintiff to recover for the death of his wife caused by her fear for 
her children's safety, they having been put in jeopardy as she imagined, 
by defendant's leaving a truck improperly braked at the top of a hill, 
the majority judges assumed the existence of a duty and placed their 
discussion on the "breach of duty." Naturally once it is assumed that 
there is a duty in such cases, the other elements of a tort case are not 
difficult. It is remarkable, indeed, that such far-reaching extensions of 
the law as were made in these English cases should have been made 
with so little apparent consideration of the factors involved. The ad- 
ministrative difficulties, which other judges had discovered, once having 
been overcome, presumably nothing else was left to be done. What 
moved the courts to give the plaintiffs protection in these cases is largely 
a matter of conjecture. Probably in the first case the hardship (the 
factor of individual justice) of placing so severe a risk upon the plain- 
tiff rather than the defendant whose conduct imposed it was the domi- 
nant factor. In the second, this same factor, plus the fact that a stricter 
accountability of the operators of motor trucks probably appealed to 
the court as a means of preventing repetitions of this sort of accident75 
were very likely determinative. Possibly also the very ease with which 
the courts demolished the opposing arguments, not realizing that there 
must still be found some basis of duty, gave the courts an assurance of 
judgment which finds little substantial basis in the opinions. In fact, 
as much as the courts have ordinarily said in this direction may be found 
under the expansible and summarizing term called "public policy," the 
71 [1901] 2 K. B. 669. See Gagnon v. Rhode Island Co., 40 R. I. 473, 101 Atl. 
184 (1917). 
72Victorian Ry. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1887). 
73 [1925] 1 K. B. 141. But see Nuckless v. Tenn. Elec. Power Co., 299 S. W. 
775 (Tenn. 1927) ; (1928) 26 MICH. LAW REV. 707. 
74 Supra note 67. 75 This is the "prophylactic factor" to be discussed later. 
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starting point for the study of any science of law, rather than its end, as 
is so gerrerally assumed. 
The same sort of situation is found in the extension of the "mental 
suffering" doctrine to the "telegraph cases" of which the "death mes- 
sage" is typical. The early case76 which initiated this doctrine assumed 
the duty as being imposed by virtue of the telegraph company's offer- 
ing a public service. That done, there was no further difficulty. The 
court, however, very emphatically cautions against a loose administra- 
tion of the rule. Subsequent cases in the same jurisdiction indicate the 
severe struggle the courts had in determining whether the basis of re- 
sponsibility was in tort or contract.77 This was the struggle in most of 
the states which adopted the doctrine.78 Most courts adopted the con- 
tract theory, although the same courts make the point immaterial by a 
liberal extension of the third-party beneficiary doctrine, and in cases 
where this will not work fall back upon the tort theory.79 Obviously 
the question of what sort of action is involved falls beside the point.80 
The important point still remains. Why does the law extend its pro- 
tection to the emotional interest involved in these cases in absence of 
physical hurt? It is no easier to resolve this question when liability is 
considered contractual than when tortious. The answer given by the 
courts which uphold the doctrine ignore this question except by infer- 
ence. The soundest basis for such cases is probably found in the pro- 
phylactic value it has, and here it has much to commend it. The courts 
which oppose rest their opposition on the administrative difficulties simi- 
lar in all respects, except that they are more aggravated here, to those 
in other "mental suffering" cases.81 But the doctrine once being set 
7 So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881). Other courts 
placed the doctrine on the same basis. See Cashion v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
124 N. C. 459, 32 S. E. 746 (1899). 
7 Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 542, 563 (1883); Stuart v. Western 
Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. 351 (1885); Horn v. Western Union Tel. 
Co., 109 Tex. 229, 194 S. W. 386 (1917); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brooks, 279 
S. W. 443, 115 Tex. 168 (1926) ; (1926) 4 TEX. L. REV. 270, 540. 
78 I STREET, op. cit. supra note 56, 471, et seq. 
9 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Snodgrass, 94 Tex. 284, 60 S. W. 308 (1901). 
80 Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895). 
8Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893); Tyler 
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 634 (W. D. Va. 1893); Jones v. Western 
Union Tel. Co., 233 Fed. 301 (S. D. Calif. 1916); Curtin v. Western Union Tel. 
Co., 13 App. Div. 253, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1109 (lst Dept. 1897); Western Union Tel. 
Co. v. Choteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 Pac. 879 (1911); Note (1914) 49 L. R. A. 
(N.s.) 206. Lurton, J., in Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 
695, 721 (1888), dissenting said: "Vague and shadowy, there is no possible 
standard by which such an injury can be justly compensated, or even approxi- 
mately measured. Easily simulated and impossible to disprove, it falls within 
all of the objections to speculative damages ...." 
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afloat, the duty element once having been assumed, it is remarkable what 
extensions the idea has received.82 
A recent New York case83 illustrates the growth in this direction. 
A father died aboard ship. His body was embalmed and carried for 
several days, and then for some unexplained reason, buried at sea while 
the ship was only twenty-four hours out from New York. Notice could 
have been given to the plaintiff, a son, but such was not done until after 
the ship arrived in port. The court allowed a recovery to the son on 
the ground that the ship was under a duty to notify him and hold the 
body at his direction, though the court repudiated the contention that 
the action was based upon a property interest in the corpse. But there 
can be found in the opinion no trace of the factors which moved the 
court to allow a recovery here when it repudiates the same idea in the 
telegraph cases.84 
Equally interesting is the fact that when such emotional disturb- 
ances are caused by intentional conduct on the defendant's part, although 
physical force is absent, courts unhesitatingly give protection, although 
they give few hints as to why they do so.85 In short, here is an enor- 
mous field which is being dealt with, no doubt carefully enough, but with 
slight intimations from the courts that they give any consideration to 
the factors involved other than those of administration. Similar obser- 
vations can be made in many series of cases. 
In the celebrated case of Winterbottom v. Wright,86 Lord Abinger 
said: "We ought not to permit a doubt to rest upon this subject for our 
doing so might be the means of letting in upon us an infinity of actions. 
. . .Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as these to the 
parties who entered them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, 
to which I see no limit, would ensue." Alderson, B., in the same case 
said: "The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who 
enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond that there is no reason 
why we should not go fifty. The only real argument in favor of the 
action is that this is a case of hardship." Rolfe, B., agreed: ". . . it 
is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but, 
by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has 
been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law." Thus the 
82 See Wetesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689 (1925); 
(1926) 10 MINN. L. REV. 434. See also (1922) 6 MINN. L. REV. 321. 
3 Finlay v. Atlantic Trans. Co., 220 N. Y. 249, 115 N. E. 715 (1917). 
84 Curtin v. The Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 81. 
SNickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Janvier v. Sweeney 
[19191 2 K. B. 316; Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N. W. 814, 167 Minn. 203 (1926); 
see (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1148; Boyle v. Chandler, 138 Atl. 273 (Del. 1927); 
Dunn v. Smith. 74 S. W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903); Gadbury v. Bleits, 133 Wash. 
134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925); Note (1925) 44 A. L. R. 429. 
8810 M. & W. 109 (1842). 
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court was impelled to find no duty although the justice factor strongly 
demanded judgment the other way. And of the many cases which have 
dealt with the so-called "dangerous instrumentality" those in which re- 
covery has been denied stick close to these reasons. The so-called ex- 
ceptions87 found in the poison drug cases,88 the food cases,89 as well as 
those involving mechanical devices,90 have, it is true, about eaten the 
rule away. But even so, the courts have satisfied themselves largely 
by repudiating the arguments based upon administrative difficulties, and 
have given little foundation for their cases to rest upon. The different 
forms of statement are indicated in a recent Tennessee case :91 
"Practically all the modern cases are to the effect that the ultimate con- 
sumer of foods, medicines, or beverages may bring his action against the 
manufacturer for injuries caused by the negligent preparation of such 
articles. . . . Some of the cases place the liability on the ground heretofore 
stated (imminently dangerous to human life or health). Others place it on 
pure food statutes. Others say there is an implied warranty when goods are 
dispensed in original packages, which is available to all damaged by their use, 
and another case says that the liability rests upon the demands of social jus- 
tice." 
Then mark the concluding sentence: 
"Upon whatever ground the liability of such a manufacturer to the 
ultimate consumer is placed, the result is eminently satisfactory, conducive 
to the public welfare, and one which we approve." (Italics mine.) 
Here is a healthy pragmatism which ought to encourage judges to 
observe the mocking emptiness of much of their theology. Good rea- 
sons are seldom far afield for any conclusion which commends itself 
strongly. But if they cannot be articulated, at least the conclusion can 
be stated with decisiveness. 
There are, of course, other constraining considerations aside from 
those of administration. But if I were hazarding a guess I should say 
that the administrative difficulties have always been the first to present 
themselves to common law courts, and it is only after they have been 
overcome that the remaining factors are given the recognition which 
we sometimes feel they should have. These difficulties of administration 
87 See Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 
1903). 
'Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 396 (1852). 
8 Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (1919) 5 IOWA L. 
BULL. 6, 86. 
"0MacPherson v. Buick Co., supra note 36; Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 128 
Atl. 242 (N. J. L. 1925). 
9lBoyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 29, 177 S. W. 80, 81 
(1914). 
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are always of greatest significance in any new development of the law, 
and probably stand out more distinctly in other types of cases than they 
do in negligence cases, as will be illustrated later. Duties must await the 
court's finding a workable method by which they can be given meaning. 
Morals, justice, business and purification of the social stream by pro- 
phylactic treatment, must all abide the time when the court has adjusted 
its scheme of things to the exigencies of its internal affairs. 
(To BE CONCLUDED) 
LEON GREEN 
YALE LAW SCHOOL 
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